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Abstract
We use an original survey of academic women in the UK to investigate different di-
mensions of the motherhood penalty. Being a mother has no effect on salaries, but still
slows down career progression even in such a high-skilled sector. Motherhood has an
ambivalent impact on women’s perception of their working environment: improving
satisfaction, but reducing perception of salary fairness relative to men. Our paper also
explores how different policies can mitigate the motherhood penalties. We find that
more generous maternity provisions are associated with higher salary, potentially be-
cause generosity reduces the crowding out of research activity. Better availability of
childcare and an even distribution of responsibilities within the household correlate
positively with earnings. Our findings also highlight the importance of a supportive
work environment for mothers’ career and well-being at the workplace. Taken to-
gether, these findings suggest the necessity of a multi-faceted policy response to the
motherhood penalties.
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1 Introduction
Sociologists call it the “motherhood penalty”: the earnings and career gaps between
women with and without children. Such gaps can be substantial, as much as 20% for
income over the long-run (Kleven et al., 2019), to the point that existing research recom-
mends women to wait until their are about 31-34 years old before having children (Leung
et al., 2016). But how widespread is the ”motherhood penalty”? Does it only affect the
salary and career paths of women, or does it also touch on other aspects of their working
life, such as their satisfaction and perception of being treated fairly compared to men? In
other words, how many penalties do women bear for becoming mothers?
In this paper, we leverage a unique survey, answered by more than 9,000 women
working in the UK academic sector, to shed light on these questions. We show no obvi-
ous motherhood penalty on salaries and an ambivalent effect on their careers. Compared
to non-mothers, mothers are more likely to be in permanent positions (having tenure),
but take longer to reach top roles (becoming professors). The first result is possibly due
to the common practice of postponing childbirth until getting a secure contract. These
effects appear to be driven by “recent” mothers, who became pregnant after 2012, even
after controlling for age. These “new” mothers also experience lower earnings. These re-
sults suggest that while women may eventually catch up with their peers after pregnancy,
there is a short-term negative effect of becoming mothers.
Our survey also allows us to measure the spillovers of motherhood on other, often
overlooked, dimensions. Compared to childless women, mothers spend more time com-
muting to work at the time of the interview, possibly due to the necessity of moving to
areas with affordable housing and better-quality schools. Furthermore, while mothers
exhibit higher levels of job satisfaction compared to women without children, they are
more likely to report feelings of unfairness in salary vis-à-vis their male colleagues.
How are we to interpret these ambivalent effects? The existing literature denouncing
the under-representation of women in top positions (i.e. the so-called “leaking pipe”)
suggests one possible interpretation. With a permanent contract, mothers are more se-
cure and, consequently, more likely to be satisfied. Yet, reaching permanency, though an
important step, is not the end of an academic career. Mothers, like all other academics,
seek to become professors. The under-representation of women at the top now becomes
more salient, which heightens feelings of unfair treatment relative to male academics.
We then go beyond documenting the multiple-faces of the motherhood penalty in
academia and try to disentangle which factors aggravate or mitigate the difficulties moth-
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ers experience at work, with particular attention to maternity provisions. There is in fact
no consensus in the economic literature on the effectiveness of more generous leaves in
helping retaining mothers in employment or preventing a drop in their salaries in the
long-run, due to the ambivalent impact of a longer absence from work on mothers’ hu-
man capital. We rely a novel dataset (Troeger et al. 2020) containing the current and
previous occupational maternity packages offered across 160 UK Higher Education Insti-
tutions (HEIs) to contribute to this debate. We exploit a fine-grained measure of the ma-
ternity leave provisions available at the time of each childbirth for the academic mothers
in our sample. We document a positive and significant relationship between the generos-
ity of the leave provisions available at the time of the most recent childbirth and current
salaries. We also find no evidence suggesting a reduction in research activity while on
leave (i.e. a depreciation in - broadly defined - human capital). Maternity leave is neg-
atively correlated with teaching activities in the first months after giving birth. Mothers
benefiting from generous packages appear to face less financial pressures and are able to
devote more time to their newborn and, possibly, to their research activity at a crucial
stage of their personal and professional lives.
Our extensive questionnaire allows us to look at further dimensions known to be rele-
vant in the aftermath of a maternity leave: family arrangements, availability of childcare
provisions and informal practices at the workplace. We uncover three important patterns
in our data.
First, the distribution of child-rearing tasks within the household strongly affects moth-
ers’ salaries. Mothers with supportive partners (who share equally parenting chores) earn
significantly more than mothers who take on most of the child-raising duties. Similarly,
mothers who have access to less than thirty hours of weekly childcare in the two years
following childbirth have lower salaries than those who can rely on more childcare ser-
vices. Time allocation of mothers between family and career may again offer one possible
rationale for these results. Leave generosity, an involved partner, and childcare assis-
tance all contribute to freeing up some time to devote to research, decreasing the risk of a
depreciation of human capital of mothers.
Second, the working environment matters. Upon returning from their latest maternity
leave, mothers who felt excluded from important work-related activities and decisions,
earn lower salaries and are less likely to have achieved professorial status (by the time
of the survey), compared to those who did not. Subjective feelings of discrimination in
the departmental life appear to reflect into actual, objective difficulties in climbing the
academic ladder.
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Third, support from line managers appears crucial. Mothers who can rely on helpful
Head of Departments (HoD) upon returning to work report higher satisfaction and fair-
ness in the allocation of tasks and wages relative to men. This operates in stark contrast to
feelings of exclusion, suggesting a persistent, positive impact of a working environment
adapted to the needs of mothers.
We establish our results in a sector - UK academia - that is quite specific: employ-
ees are highly specialised and educated and can often benefit from flexible working ar-
rangements. Yet, finding any career impact of motherhood, as we do, in an environment
where we would arguably least expect it, provides reasonable grounds for policy inter-
vention. How informative are our findings for policymakers? Our paper is possibly the
first to document the widespread effect of motherhood at the individual level, with a rep-
resentative sample of respondents from virtually all establishments in a particular sector,
UK academia. Our paper complements the existing literature by giving voice directly to
women. Furthermore, our results might sometimes be the best evidence available (e.g. a
randomization of Head of Department support might not be a feasible option).
For all these reasons, despite the risk of reverse causality (e.g., higher satisfaction
today leading to reinterpret past experiences in a favourable light), despite the risk of
self-selection (e.g., women putting less weight on their career would tend to select less
supportive partners), we believe our findings hold useful lessons for policy-makers. To
improve satisfaction, it is best to intervene at the line manager level, offering Head of
Departments training opportunities to increase awareness of the complexity of the moth-
erhood experience. In turn, generous maternity policies, reliefs, and childcare assistance
allow mothers to best allocate their time between research, teaching, and family life so
as to minimize the depreciation of their human capital and increase their earning and
career perspectives in the long run. Finally, for the same reasons, removing stereotypes
on who “should be” the primary caretaker, rethinking how child-rearing tasks are dis-
tributed within the household, appears to be key.1 A task, we recognize, easier said than
done.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we frame our work
within the scholarly contributions advanced by the literature. We describe our data in
Section 3 and our empirical approach in Section 4. We look at the effect of motherhood
on academic careers and satisfaction in Section 5, while the role of formal maternity pro-
visions, informal practices in the workplace and family/childcare arrangements is dis-
1The 2018 British Social Attitude Survey documents that only 7% of respondents felt that mothers of
young children should work full time. A depressing number when put into perspective with our findings.
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cussed in Section 6, with particular attention to the activities academic mothers perform
while on leave. We conduct a number of robustness checks in Section 7 while the last
section concludes.
2 Literature Review
One of the conditions that has been shown to hold back women from equal access to jobs
and pays, compared to men, is becoming a mother (Correll et al., 2007; Sigle-Rushton
and Waldfogel, 2007). In sharp contrast with fathers, women experience a decline in their
earning capacity once they give birth (Bertrand et al., 2010; Kleven et al., 2019). The rea-
sons for such penalty are usually ascribed to the career breaks associated to motherhood
(Aisenbrey et al., 2009; Arun et al., 2004; Bröckel, 2018; McIntosh et al., 2012), the depreci-
ation of human capital that follows (Albrecht et al., 1999; Anderson et al., 2002; Stratton,
1995) and the tendency to switch to part-time schedules and/or lesser paid jobs in its
aftermath (Budig and England, 2001; Waldfogel, 1997). While the effect is driven in sig-
nificant part by mothers who exit the labor market altogether (Ejrnæs and Kunze, 2013),
it is still apparent among those who return to work (Joshi et al., 1999).
Our work speaks to the latter category of mothers, who are highly educated and work
in a highly specialized environment, that is the UK academic sector. In this sense, our
paper relates to Lutter and Schröder (2020), who focus on the effect of having children on
productivity in one discipline (i.e. Sociology) in German academia. Our paper, in turn,
considers a different range of outcomes and mechanisms, within a broader pool of respon-
dents and wider range of disciplines. Our sample, by construction, comprises exclusively
of highly-educated, autonomous mothers, allowing us to hold education constant.2 This
represents a relevant advantage, as educational levels appear to play a significant role in
explaining the motherhood penalty, due to the higher cost of career breaks in high-skilled
professions (Anderson et al., 2002; England et al., 2016) and in fields characterised by
long and job-specific working hours (Bütikofer et al., 2018; Goldin, 2014). The same holds
true for professions with low autonomy, high emphasis on teamwork and competitive
pressure (Yu and Kuo, 2017).
In the paper, we look at the effect that maternity leave provisions have on careers,
which is the subject of a large debate in the literature. The short-term effect of an in-
crease in the pro-rata payment and/or in the duration of the offered leave is mechanical,
2In our analysis, we exclude those respondents who did not complete a PhD, in order to further increase
homogeneity across the sample.
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especially if the maternity leave is well paid (Hanel, 2013): a drop in female wage and
employment (Hanratty and Trzcinski, 2009; Ondrich et al., 2003), as mothers are encour-
aged to pause working in the weeks following delivery. In the long-run, though, the
picture is more blurry. Research on the relationship between maternity leave and wages
is usually conducted looking at the extensive margin, namely comparing women who
have access to paid (or more generous) leave to those who do not, generally finding a
weak relationship between maternity provisions and wages (Dahl et al., 2016; Hashimoto
et al., 2004; Klerman and Leibowitz, 1999; Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014). Among others,
a recent study by Girsberger et al. (2019) shows how the introduction of paid maternity
leave in Switzerland exerted a small impact on mothers’ wages (negative in the short-run
and slightly positive after four years). Our results are partly in line with this literature.
Maternity provisions exert a small but significant positive effect on women’s salaries in
the long-run, even in the high-skill sector under scrutiny.
Like salaries, findings on the impact of more generous leaves on career progression
are overall mixed. While several scholars argue that generous leaves help women retain-
ing firm-specific human capital and, in turn, improving their career opportunities (Dex
et al., 1998; Lalive and Zweimüller, 2009; Waldfogel, 1998, 2001; Zveglich and Rodgers,
2003), others reach the opposite conclusion (Lai and Masters, 2005; Ondrich et al., 2002;
Rønsen and Sundström, 2002). In this paper, we do not find any significant relationship
of more generous leave and career advancements. We then go one step further, looking at
the impact on women’s ability to remain active in the weeks following childbirth. Some
authors have in fact argued that a longer leave might negatively affect women’s careers
by generating a depreciation of their human capital (Low and Sánchez-Marcos, 2015), a
reduction in working hours (Dechter, 2014) and, possibly, work-related training (Puhani
and Sonderhof, 2011). We show that, in our setting, the availability of more generous
maternity provisions does not seem to crowd out research activity at a delicate stage of
mothers’ academic careers. Rather, with adequate financial support, mothers do not have
to take on extra teaching to supplement their income after giving birth.
Institutional forms of support are also regarded as factors that can alleviate the spillovers
of motherhood in the workplace. Assistance from line managers, flexible working hours,
childcare facilities and, more generally, a family-friendly workplace culture are all re-
puted as “critical elements in making work-family or work-life efforts effective” (Galinsky et al.,
1996, p. 112). As stressed in Thompson et al. (1999), a supportive work–family culture
is closely related to the employees’ perception of how “acceptable” it is to make use of
the family-oriented programs offered formally. Informal practices at the workplace, while
benefiting all employees, are therefore particularly relevant for mothers. Women in a sup-
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portive working environment are in fact more likely to be still active during their third
trimester and attend their job responsibilities immediately after delivery (Glass and Ri-
ley, 1998). This, in turn, is likely to affect their attachment and commitment to the job
(Bailyn, 2003; Greenberger et al., 1989; Grover and Crooker, 1995; Lyness et al., 1999).
For work-life balance provisions to be effective in retaining and supporting women, they
need to account for the specificity of the sector. Mentoring and support programs, flexible
work schedules, daycare centers and family leaves have been advanced as desirable for
women’s thrive in the IT sector (i.a. Jepson and Perl, 2002; Wentling and Thomas, 2009).
Sponsorship from senior colleagues and access to leadership positions are among the
practices identified as crucial for the retention/progression of women in the medical field
(i.a. Bates et al., 2016; Travis et al., 2013). As for the academic sector, well paid maternity
leave, norms regulating tenure decisions, promotion systems taking family responsibili-
ties into account, along with a working environment that values diversity and equality,
are all factors that contribute to the presence and place of female academics (Blum, 1991;
Finkel et al., 1994; Finkel and Olswang, 1996; Isgro and Castañeda, 2015; Mason et al.,
2013; Van den Brink and Benschop, 2012; Ward and Wolf-Wendel, 2004). In this paper, we
are able to disentangle the effect of both formal and informal types of support offered to
women in academia, showing how each affects mothers’ careers and perceptions in dif-
ferent ways. These findings, which we uncover thanks to our original, large-scale survey,
represents, to the best of our knowledge, a novel contribution to the literature.
Finally, our work connects to the large body of literature that studies the impact of
family arrangements on women’s labour market outcomes. In a seminal contribution,
Becker (1985) highlights how child-rearing responsibilities impede investments in hu-
man capital and reduce the working hours of women, yielding large gender differences
in labour market. Lundberg and Rose (2000) provide evidence consistent with Becker’s
theory. The division of labour within the family exerts significant spillovers on women’s
behaviour, thus exacerbating the disparities between men and women in the job market.
As for the academic sector, Backer (2012:22) posits that “gendered living arrangements and
unequal workloads at home contribute to the perpetuation of the academic gender gap”3 Similarly,
Craig (2006) finds that gender inequality in childcare duties impairs the career progres-
sion of academic women, but that college-educated fathers tend to be more supportive.
In our paper, we recover most of these patterns: both domestic support and the availabil-
ity of longer childcare hours are positively and significantly correlated with the mother’s
current salary, even after controlling for the partner’s employment at childbirth.
3See also Baker (2010).
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3 Our Data
We devote this section to describing our novel data. We first present our survey in detail,
and then move to describe the information we have collected on current and previous
occupational maternity packages offered by UK Higher Education Institutions (HEIs).
3.1 The Survey
We exploit an online survey of virtually the whole population of academic women in the
UK, conducted between January 2016 and June 2017. The survey consists of more than
115 questions 4 sent to 59,161 valid email addresses. Approximately 17% of academic
women filled the questionnaire, yielding a total of 9,671 observations.
The survey covers respondents from 138 UK Higher Education Institutions (HEIs)5
out of a total of 163 (HESA, 2016).6 All of the 24 universities belonging to the Russell
group are represented. The University College London is the most represented (525 obs.),
whereas Arts University Bournemouth, Canterbury Christ Church University and Liv-
erpool John Moores University have only one respondent each. Women in our sample
work across 37 different disciplines: Psychology, Psychiatry and Neuroscience are the
fields with the highest number of respondents (750 obs.), followed by Biological Sciences
(742 obs.). 287 respondents work in Politics and International Studies, while 142 women
come from Economics and Econometrics. Compared to the population data from the
Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA) for the academic year 2015/16, our sample
under-represents women aged 30 years old or below and over-represents those aged 36-
45. This skewness in the age distribution has some advantages as it allows us to focus on
women who were in their fertile years during the most recent wave of maternity reforms
in the UK. As a result of the age distribution, our survey is also overcrowded with profes-
sors and academics on a permanent position or full-time contract, compared to the HESA
4The actual number of questions varies depending on the characteristics of the respondent
5The 26 universities not represented in the data, due to the lack of respondents, are: Arts Univer-
sity Bournemouth, Central School of Speech & Drama, Glasgow Caledonian University, London Business
School, Royal Academy of Music (University of London), Royal Conservatoire of Scotland, Courtauld Insti-
tute of Art (University of London), Robert Gordon University, University College Birmingham, University
for the Creative Arts, University of Cumbria, University of Wales, Ravensbourne University, Rose Bruford
College, Conservatoire for Dance and Drama, Guildhall School of Music and Drama, Institute of Cancer Re-
search, Leeds College of Art, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, National Film and Television School,
Newman University, Plymouth College of Art, St Mary’s University College, Stranmillis University Col-
lege, University of St. Mark and St. John, Writtle University College.
6Our questionnaire included one option - ”Institute of Education, University of London” - not present
in the 2015/16 HESA sample, raising the total number of institutions covered in our survey to 138.
7
population.7
The survey is almost equally split between mothers and childless women (54% vs.
46%). Most mothers have one (38%) or two children (49%), with few having three children
(about 5%) or more (1% between 4 and 6). Since large families are rare and potentially
different from the rest of the sample, we exclude mothers with more than three children
from our main empirical analysis.8 Table 1 displays summary statistics for mothers and
non-mothers in our sample.9 Mothers are 47 years-old on average and earn a gross annual
salary of £48,823. 23% of them are professors, 79% on permanent contracts, only 5% on
fixed-terms positions (not displayed). The average number of children is 1.77. Compared
to mothers, women without children are younger, earn less and are less likely to be on
permanent/professorial contracts (all differences between mothers and non-mothers are
statistically significant at 1%).
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Mothers and Non-Mothers.
Mothers Non-Mothers
Mean St. Dev. N. Mean St. Dev. N. p-value
Age 46.91 8.88 3,033 41.60 9.78 2722 0.000
Gross Salary 48,824 16,255 3,358 44,827 14,344 3,128 0.000
Professor 0.23 0.42 3,722 0.15 0.35 3,603 0.000
Permanent 0.80 0.40 3,688 0.63 0.48 3,577 0.000
N. Children 1.77 0.75 3,722 0 0 3,604 -
Salary is measured by £5,000 increments from £17,500 up to £105,000. Professor is an in-
dicator variable taking value one if the respondent reports her current title to be Professor.
Permanent and Fixed-Term are indicator variables taking the value of one if the respondent
reports her current contract is permanent or fixed-term, respectively. All variables are mea-
sured at the time of the survey.
3.2 Occupational Maternity Provisions in UK Academia
Maternity provisions are generally characterized by two dimensions: their length - the
time one can take off without losing her job - and generosity - the financial support granted
while on leave - which can be either statutory, hence mandated by the Government, or
occupational, enhanced and managed by the employer.
7For detailed information on our survey, its features and its representativeness with respect to the HESA
academic population, see Troeger et al. (2020)).
8We focus on women who answered at least 90% of the questionnaire, hold a PhD at the time of the
survey and are not emeriti or research assistants. We also remove the small number of respondents (47) who
indicated they adopted at least one of their children, as parental provisions differ slightly for those who
adopt.
9Descriptive statistics for the controls and outcomes studied are presented in detail in Appendix A.
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Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) is set at the national level and provides those who
satisfy the eligibility criterion with a minimum weekly payment. In the UK, since 2007,
eligible mothers must have worked continuously for the same employer for at least 26
weeks up to the 15th week before the expected week of childbirth, earning more than
£120 a week on average. If a woman qualifies for SMP, she receives 90% of her average
weekly earnings (before tax) for the first 6 weeks, and then a flat payment (or 90% of the
average weekly earnings, whichever is lower) for the next 33 weeks.10 The final 13 weeks
of leave are unpaid (the maximum length of leave in the UK is 52 weeks).
Given the meagre legal minimum set forth by the UK law, many employers - including
universities - offer what is known as Occupational Maternity Pay (OMP). UK HEIs are an
interesting case-study in this sense, as they exhibit important variations in the provisions
they offer, which stem, in particular, from the strategic goals each university pursues.11
For this project, we gathered data on the occupational packages offered over time by
160 universities in the UK. Among the different indexes generally used to capture leave
generosity12, we opted for the so-called “Full Weeks Equivalent” (FWE), which looks at
the full monetary value of the benefit.13 Our data confirms the existence of a significant
heterogeneity across UK HEIs (Table 2). The FWE index for occupational packages cur-
rently being offered ranges between 5.40 and 26: at one extreme we have 1 university not
topping-up the SMP at all, at the other 9 grant six months of full monetary compensation.
Almost two-thirds of the institutions offer between 5.40 to 17 weeks of full pay, with a
cluster of thirty-one providing 18.
10The exact amount of the weekly payment is adjusted yearly by the Government to account for inflation.
At the time of writing, it corresponds to £151.20.
11See Epifanio and Troeger (2019) for a more detailed discussion.
12Other widely adopted measures of generosity are the “full salary replacement weeks” and the number
of weeks in which any salary is paid, either fully or partially. Our results remain robust to using the former,
while we tend to discard the latter measure, which does not account for the share of salary being replaced.
13The index is computed as follows. For a package consisting of 6 weeks paid at 100% and 9 at 90%,
the measure equals to the sum of the number of each “type” of week, weighted by the salary replacement
received (in this case, 1 and 0.90, respectively, leading to a FWE of 6*1+0.90*9=14.10).
9
Table 2: Full Weeks Equivalent by University (2019).
Full Weeks Equivalent N. of Universities %
0.00 1 0.63
5.40 5 3.13
11.40 4 2.50
11.80 33 20.63
12.00 17 10.63
13.00 1 0.63
14.00 1 0.63
15.00 2 1.25
15.80 5 3.13
16.00 28 17.50
17.00 7 4.38
18.00 31 19.38
19.00 3 1.88
19.50 5 3.13
20.00 3 1.88
21.90 1 0.63
22.00 4 2.50
22.50 1 0.63
26.00 8 5.00
Total 160 100.00
By digging into the provisions offered in previous decades by UK HEIs, we were able
to retrieve the occupational benefits available to our respondents at the time of each child-
birth.14 In Table 3 we show that, at the time of their most recent childbirth, approximately
15% of mothers were granted between 5 and 15.8 weeks at full salary, two thirds ben-
efited from between 16 to 18 FWE, with the remaining 19% being entitled to 19 to 26
weeks. The descriptive statistics discussed in this section therefore point to the fact that
academic mothers enjoyed substantially different maternity benefits following their latest
pregnancy, and that the generosity of the maternity provisions varies greatly across UK
14Whenever the childbirth date precedes the approval date of the oldest document in our possession for
the relevant institution, we impute that policy as the one applying to this respondent. It is partly to reduce
the impact of such assumption on our estimates that, in the empirical analysis, we focus on the most recent
childbirth.
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Higher Education Institutions, even in current times.
Table 3: Full Weeks Equivalent (FWE) at most recent childbirth.
Full Weeks Equivalent Number of Mothers %
5.40 11 0.59
5.80 2 0.11
11.40 5 0.27
11.80 118 6.32
12.00 118 6.32
13.00 4 0.21
13.80 5 0.27
15.00 6 0.32
15.80 5 0.27
16.00 518 27.76
17.00 75 4.02
18.00 646 34.62
19.00 16 0.86
19.50 39 2.09
20.00 17 0.91
21.90 2 0.11
22.00 85 4.56
23.40 11 0.59
26.00 183 9.81
Total 1,866 100.00
4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical analysis proceeds in three distinct steps. First, we conduct a simple com-
parison between women with and without children, to uncover the relationship between
motherhood and current outcomes. Second, we compare the career progression of moth-
ers and non-mothers. Finally, we explore factors that can alleviate (or aggravate) the
motherhood penalty in academia. We describe each analysis in turn here, before showing
our results in the following section.
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4.1 Estimating the Motherhood Penalties
We first compare mothers and non-mothers on a number of dimensions, by means of
a simple linear regression. We characterize their professional achievements in terms of
current gross salary, tenure and professorial status. We also explore differences in terms
of job satisfaction and perceptions regarding the fairness of salary and task allocation,
compared to male colleagues. Finally, we analyse a factor often linked to satisfaction: the
current commuting time to the workplace. This is operationalized through the following
regression:
Yidu = α + β1 Motheridu + β2 Xi + β3 Wu + δd + εidu (1)
The six different outcomes (Yidu, where i is an academic currently working in disci-
pline d, at university u), are all captured at the time of the survey.15 First, we employ a
rank variable capturing the gross income, measured by £5,000 increments, from £17,500
to £105,000. Then, we look at a range of dichotomous variables measured at the time of
the interview and taking value one if, respectively: (1) having full professorial status; (2)
holding a permanent contract; (3) Being neutral/somewhat/very satisfied at the work-
place; (4) Judging the salary allocation as fair or probably fair; (5) Judging the distribu-
tion of teaching and administrative responsibilities as fair or probably fair; (6) Reporting
a commuting time to work of 45 minutes or more.16
The main explanatory variable of interest is Motheridu, equal to one if the academic
has children (any number), else zero.17 We also include a set of individual controls (Xi),
measured at the time of the survey, a set of characteristics of the university respondents
currently works for (Wu ) that we retrieve from HESA administrative data, and fixed ef-
fects for the current department (δd).18 We include the following individual controls: di-
chotomous variables equal to one if the respondent is a full professor and on a permanent
15The specific wording of the survey items used to construct our variables is reported in Appendix B and,
more extensively, in Troeger et al. (2020).
16Even though most of the outcomes are binary choice variables, we estimate linear probability models
due to the inclusion of departmental fixed effects. For this reason, random effects probit models are not
appropriate - and conditional logit models prove to be very inefficient. Since we are only interpreting the
direction and significance of effects, this choice does not appear to be problematic, especially since findings
are consistent in sign and magnitude when we run the regressions with binary outcomes using a logit
model, as shown in Appendix C.1.
17In Appendix C.1, we show how findings are robust to different operationalizations of the variable, as
well as when we look at the marginal effect of having more than one child.
18With department fixed effects, we compare mothers and non-mothers within a given discipline (eco-
nomics, geology, etc.). We, therefore, cannot uncover heterogeneous effects of motherhood on salary and
other outcomes across disciplines. We plan to devote further attention to this aspect in the future, using
finer-grained data on individual publications.
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contract, respectively,19, fixed effects for her reported responsibilities (teaching, research,
administration) and birth decade, a rank variable for the number of employments over
time reported in the survey. These variables help us capturing the level of experience
and the responsibilities of the respondent: factors that are likely correlated with her cur-
rent perceptions regarding the job and her salary. We also control for the year in which
the respondent began her latest job, as this might affect both chances of being promoted
and current satisfaction. Finally, we employ a rank variable capturing current commut-
ing time,20 given that commuting might be positively (negatively) correlated with salary
(satisfaction) but higher salary might compensate the longer distance from home.
In terms of HEI characteristics, we include in our regression indicators for whether
the university belongs to the Russell Group21 and to the so-called “Golden Triangle”22,
and control for the score it obtained in the 2008 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE).
These variables serve as useful proxies for the academic “prestige” of the respondent’s
institution at the time of the survey, which is likely highly correlated with her research
output over time. We also control for the share of female academics being employed and
for the average salary earned by female employees for the current HEI, as indicators of
the gender diversity and female condition at the institution.23
4.2 The Impact of Childbirth Timing on Careers
The empirical strategy described in the previous section allows us to recover in a more ro-
bust way the patterns discussed in Table 1 and beyond. However, it is not without flaws.
Mothers and non-mothers might in fact differ on a number of unobservable character-
istics, such as their field or partner choice, their willingness to change employer, their
productivity and ambition to climb the academic ladder: all factors likely correlated with
their career progression and current salary, and beyond our control. Further, women may
decide to become mothers after having reached a certain stage of their career, suggesting
that our estimates suffer from reverse causality. To alleviate these concerns, in additional
tests we now present, we focus on a subset of individuals who exhibit similar character-
19Except when professorship and contractual status are the outcome variables.
20Except when commuting time is the outcome variable.
21See https://russellgroup.ac.uk/about/our-universities/ for more details.
22We include as members of the Golden Triangle the following HEIs: University of Cambridge, Uni-
versity of Oxford, Imperial College London, University College London, King’s College London, London
School of Economics and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
23All these variables measured in 2013 by HESA, unless noted otherwise. Such date is chosen to ensure
that, from a time-series perspective, the causes (i.e. the right-hand-side variables) precede the effects (the
dependent variables).
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istics at a specific point in time, but then differ in their decision to have a child (or not)
afterwards.24
We set an arbitrary time threshold, 1st of January 2012 (i.e. 5 years before the survey
took place), and focus exclusively on those respondents who, by that time, were: (1)
employed in UK academia and; (2) not full professors. The reason behind our date choice
is twofold: firstly, it allows for a sufficient lag for someone to obtain a promotion by the
time of the survey; secondly, it prevents us from losing too much statistical power, as
the information contained in our survey becomes more and more sparse going back in
time, due to the distribution of childbirths.We show how results are robust to the choice
of different thresholds in Appendix C.2.
Among this subset of respondents, we then define as “treated” those individuals who
had their most recent child between 2012 and the time of the survey (conditional on hav-
ing a non-professorial status by January 1, 2012).25 We compare these respondents to two
different “control” groups: the first, constituted by respondents who never had children;
the second, consisting of mothers who had their last baby before December 31, 2009 (two
years before the threshold). The adoption of two separate control groups allows us to
explore a further nuance of the motherhood penalty, distinguishing between the “exten-
sive” margin - choosing to have at least one child, or not - and the “intensive” margin -
the impact of recently having a baby, compared to an earlier pregnancy. This second com-
parison removes a significant part of the endogeneity issue discussed above since both
treated and control now have had children. It should be noted, however, that we are then
measuring whether the effect of motherhood decreases over time (rather than the effect of
becoming a mother) as mothers with children born before 2010 had more time to restart
their career after their latest pregnancy.
We run the following linear regression26:
Yidu = α + β1 Motherhoodidu + β2 Xi + β3 Wu + δd + εidu (2)
Where the two outcomes of interest (yidu) - all measured at the time of the survey - are:
the dummy for professorship discussed in the previous section, a further dummy taking
value one if the current gross salary is larger or equal than £62,500 (else 0). The choice
24In future research, we plan reduce selection into motherhood and dig deeper in the causal impact of
motherhood by matching mothers and non-mothers on their individual publication record.
25Results are robust to a different definition of the treatment group, focusing on the first, rather than the
latest, childbirth, as shown in Appendix C.2.
26Results are also robust to the adoption of a logit model (Appendix C.2).
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of the £62,500 threshold is due to the fact that, according to HESA27, the overwhelming
majority of senior academics earned more than £60,140 in A.Y. 2017/18.28 The variable
Motherhoodidu is a dummy taking value one if the respondent has had her most recent
pregnancy between January 1, 2012 and the survey date. As discussed above, we consider
two different control groups. In the first case, the control group is the sample of women at
the same stage of their career in 2012, but ended up not having children (i.e., the indicator
variable takes value zero for non-mothers). In the second, the control group is the sample
of mothers at the same stage of their career, but who had their last child prior to December
31, 2009.
Variables Xi and Wu in Equation 2 contains the same set of individual and university
characteristics as inEquation 1 (with the exception, obviously, of current contractual sta-
tus). We, however, add two further individual controls: mother’s age and for her number
of children at the threshold date (i.e. 2012). This is meant to address an imbalance be-
tween our control and treated groups as treated individuals, who had their most recent
child after 2012, are on average younger than members of the control group, especially
mothers who had their latest child before 2010. Absent such controls, we risk attributing
delay in reaching professorship to motherhood when it is simply an age effect. We, fur-
ther, include the same set of fixed effects as in Equation 1 (e.g., birth decade, department
fixed effects, etc.).
4.3 Correlates of the Motherhood Penalties
We seek to explore whether maternity leave provisions (i.e. de jure support) help allevi-
ating the motherhood penalties, as well as three further factors widely discussed in the
literature: formal/informal aid provided on the workplace (i.e. de facto support).
We study six out of the seven outcomes of interest: salary, professorship, permanent
contract, satisfaction, perception of fair salary, and perception of fair task relative to male
academics (the only excluded outcome being commuting time).
For this investigation, we restrict our sample to those who reported the date of birth
of their latest child (rather than just their number, as for the previous steps), and who
were employed in UK academia at the time of their most recent pregnancy.29 We impose
27See https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/staff/salaries for more information.
28Results are robust to the use of the rank variable previously discussed (Appendix C.2).
29As discussed in Troeger et al. (2020), respondents were asked to list their current and six more recent
occupations, alongside their job title and starting date of employment for each. In order to recover power
for our analysis, whenever the information on employment is not directly present in the data, but reason-
ably deductible (i.e. there are “holes” between the jobs listed) we impute occupations as follows. Firstly,
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such restrictions for a number of reasons. First, we only focus on respondents whose
academic occupation at childbirth is known in order to exactly identify the maternity
leave provisions (statutory and occupational) available at the time. Second, the most
recent childbirth is likely the most informative when looking at outcomes measured at
the time of the survey. Finally, our choice is motivated by data concerns. We seek to
minimize the risk of “imperfect recalling”, which is arguably higher once we go back in
time. Further, we aim to reduce the odds of imputing the occupational packages made
available.30 We run the following regression:
Yitdu = α + β1 Supportit + β2 Xi + β3 Vit + β4 Wu + β5 Zut + δd + θt + εitdu (3)
The independent variable of interest is Supportit, that is the amount of support re-
ceived by mother i at the time of her latest pregnancy, occurring in year t. In a first set
of regressions, we define support as the generosity of maternity leave benefits, measured
as the occupational Full Weeks Equivalent (FWE). In a second set of regressions, we use
other forms of support: childcare availability, perception of Head of Department (HoD)
support, feeling of exclusion, workload relief, and partner support. Childcare availability
is measured with a dummy equal to one if the mother reported having access to more
than 30 hours per week of childcare. HoD support builds on a survey item asking re-
spondents how supportive their HoD was immediately after returning from maternity
leave.31. We construct a dummy taking value one if the perception was slightly or very
favourable. For exclusion, we use another survey item asking mothers whether they felt
excluded “from important departmental or work-related activities that could be considered vital
to career enhancement” after returning from leave We build an indicator variable, equal
to one if a respondent answered at least “occasionally excluded” (0 otherwise). For re-
lief, we generate a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent was offered any
form of workload reduction upon returning to work: teaching and administrative loads,
amended expectations on research outputs, opportunities to take research leave, or exten-
when we know the previous and following employer, as well as their starting dates, but nothing about the
occupation in between, we assume the job to be the same as the “earlier” one. Secondly, we have cases in
which we know one employer, but we have no information about previous occupations, except for their
start date(s). In these cases, we impute these jobs (only if the start date is present) from the oldest one for
which we have such information. These assumptions are relevant as we use job start dates to determine
the employer at childbirth. Still, as we focus on the most recent delivery, when the quality of the data is
generally high, we do not expect these assumptions to drive our results.
30In Apppendix C.3, we replicate the same analysis looking at the first pregnancy, as well as computing
averages across different ones, finding consistent results.
31We look at HoD support in the first 2 years following childbirth in Appendix C.3 and find comparable
coefficients.
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sions of the probationary period. Finally, we asked mothers how many childcare duties
their partner undertook after childbirth, from 0 to 100 %. We define a partner as unsup-
portive (dummy equal to one) if (s)he was handling 25% or less of the duties. In turn,
we define a partner as supportive (dummy equal to one) if (s)he was handling above 75%
of duties. Our reference category, implicitly, is composed of partners with involvement
between 26 and 74%.
The individual controls and fixed effects, as well as the university characteristics, all
measured at the time of survey (Xi, Wu, δd) are similar to those employed in the previous
models (Equation 1 and Equation 2).32 We also add a further set of control variables
measured at the time of the latest childbirth (Vit and Zut). At the individual level (Vit),
we control for mother’s age at the time, partner’s occupation (academic/non-academic,
high/low rank, or no information on partner’s employment, with fixed effects for each
combination), contract status (permanent contract or not). We expect the respondent’s
and her partner’s contractual status to be a good proxy for the financial security of the
household at childbirth. At the institutional level (Zut), we control for the institution in
which the mother was employed when having her most recent baby. Finally, we include
a further fixed effect (θt) for the childbirth year, and control for the mother’s reported
number of children as the effect of support may vary as a function of the number of
children a mother already has.33
We also investigate how maternity policies affect the activities performed while on
leave. In this case, our dependent variable is a dummy for performing an activity on
leave: research, teaching, administrative tasks, attendance of conferences, journal editing
or peer reviewing, and mentoring. Our independent variable of interest is the monetary
compensation while on leave measured by the occupational Full Weeks Equivalent. Our
regressions also include controls for individual and institutional features at the time of
childbirth.34
Before presenting our findings, a few remarks are in order. There are various reasons
why our results have to be interpreted with some caution. First, even though we are con-
trolling for a wide array of individual and institutional characteristics, we still face several
32We drop the professorship dummy - highly correlated with the control for tenure (included) - not to
over-burden the model.
33To construct the variable we used the number of children for which we know the date of birth, rather
than the survey item asking about it. This induces some slight discrepancies with the previous section (e.g.
a mother that reports having three children but only lists the birth date for two of them would be considered
as having two here).
34We exclude controls measured at the time of the survey, in order to avoid broadly defined “post-
treatment” variables on the right-hand-side of the model.
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self-selection issues. Women who value family more may be more likely to choose unsup-
portive partners and/or sacrifice their careers following pregnancy. Hence, unobserved
preferences may explain part of the correlation between family support and career accom-
plishments. Second, our analysis may be plagued by reversed causality issues. Women
who are more productive may receive more support from their HoDs, and mothers who
are currently happier with their job may retrospectively re-evaluate their line manager
at childbirth under a more favourable light. Finally, successful academics may also feel
more confident to take longer leaves, in case there is an unobservable stigma attached to
the policy. In either case, professional accomplishments may be the cause, rather than the
effect, of the formal and informal support received.35
Nonetheless, we believe our analysis is important for three main reasons. First, lit-
tle conclusive evidence has been advanced on factors explaining and/or mitigating the
motherhood penalty. Second, the biases we document make small and even null effects
still informative. In fact, if self-selection and/or reverse causality would bias our esti-
mates away from zero, such results would be event more striking. Third, since we could
hardly randomize motherhood or HoD/family support, our findings are among the best
feasible evidence on the effect of institutional and family factors on mothers’ professional
life. With these caveats in mind, we now turn to presenting our results.
5 Motherhood Penalties: Estimation Results
We begin by showing the results of our comparison between mothers and non-mothers
in the UK academic sector. One mechanism advanced by the literature for explaining the
motherhood penalty on wages is that women tend to leave their jobs or take long breaks
from employment once they have children. In our setting, all women have managed to
remain active in academia following childbirth36, hence we would expect little (or no)
effect of motherhood on women’s career, according to the literature. Having said that, the
35Several other issues require cautious interpretation of the results. When it comes to maternity leave, we
are only measuring an “Intention to Treat” here, as the focus of our paper is on the generosity of institutional
support, rather than on actual uptake. Future research will be devoted to investigating the relationship
between leave generosity and uptake, as well as to the impact of both on publication quality and quantity. A
further confounding factor comes from the fact that maternity leave entitlements are not random. Indeed, as
shown in Epifanio and Troeger (2019), more research-oriented universities offer better arrangements. This
could be a concern if an interaction effect exists between quality of research activity and OMP generosity:
our estimates would then be capturing the effect of leave generosity and the indirect benefit of say generosity
on the careers of more research-oriented women.
36While we cannot rule out the possibility for mothers temporarily leaving academia and then returning
by the time of the survey, informal evidence seems to suggest this is a rare scenario, possibly irrelevant for
our results.
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fact that our survey necessarily suffers from sample selection issues, as we are unable to
account for the (possibly large) number of women dropping out of academia following
pregnancy, would lead us to interpret our estimates as lower bounds. For the sake of
conciseness, we only display here our preferred specification37, which includes the whole
array of individual and institutional controls discussed in the previous sections38. All
standard errors are clustered at the (current) university level.
The findings presented in Table 4 reproduce the patterns documented in the literature.
Mothers’ current salary does not differ significantly from that of non-mothers, and the
same holds true for their likelihood of being professors. Still, it is worth pointing out
that our linear regression only provides us with a “static” picture of the profession, and
is not informative of the dynamic impact motherhood exerts on careers. The null effects
we record might therefore be due to the fact that mothers are on average older, hence
had more time to reach professorship and earn a higher salary, to begin with. Results in
Column 3 suggest that mothers are more likely to be in permanent contracts, but the same
concerns hold true, as women who plan to have children may be more likely to wait until
reaching a secure occupational position.39 Further interesting patterns emerge from our
analysis (not shown in the table, but available upon request). Firstly, respondents who
are currently employed by Russell Group and Golden Triangle HEIs exhibit significantly
higher salaries and likelihood to be professors but, at the same time, a lower chance of
being on a permanent contract, consistently with the findings put forward in Epifanio
and Troeger (2019) using aggregate data. Secondly, we show how female academics from
medical professions and engineering tend to earn significantly more than in other fields.
37Full tables available upon request.
38The number of observations varies across columns due to the different response rate for the survey
items employ. We chose not to restrict our sample and have an homogeneous number across columns in
order to maximize the power of our analysis. Furthermore, given the relatively high response rate for the
survey items we use, it is reasonable to assume the distribution of missing answers to be independent from
the characteristics of the respondent.
39Support for this latter interpretation is provided by another of our works (Troeger et al., 2020).
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Table 4: Current Salary and Contract: Comparing Mothers and Non-mothers.
(1) (2) (3)
Salary Professor Permanent
Mother (1/0) -613.5 0.00954 0.0556∗∗∗
(410.779) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 6281 6907 6858
Adjusted R2 0.535 0.235 0.424
Individual controls X X X
University controls X X X
Department FE X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
When contrasting mothers and non-mothers on a number of dimensions related to
current job satisfaction and fairness perceptions (Table 5), we notice that mothers are more
likely than women without children to report contentment with their job (Column 1) and,
at the same time, to judge negatively their salary compared to male colleagues (Column
2). This finding seems consistent with the “leaking pipe” narrative. Mothers are also
women who are more likely to have reached a stable position by the time of the survey
(Table 4), therefore, they may be also content with the status and security of their job.
However, once reaching permanency, women seek to progress further and become pro-
fessors. In this process, they may feel at disadvantage compared to male colleagues given
the under-representation of female at top position and/or the gendered gap in salary.
This idea seems to be supported by the observation that academics on a permanent con-
tract are significantly more likely than women without children to perceive their salary as
unfair compared to men than (not shown in the table). As for the allocation of teaching
and administrative duties (Column 3), we find no differences between mothers and non-
mothers. We finally look at one aspect often regarded as an important component of life
satisfaction, that is commuting time. Results in Column 4 show that, compared to women
without children, mothers are more likely to reside further away from their workplace.
One plausible explanation for this could be that women with children tend to live in areas
with affordable housing and/or childcare facilities, especially if the university is located
in a big city. Alternatively, one could think that, in order to remain in academia, mothers
20
are more likely to accept less “attractive” (i.e. further away from home) job opportunities
compared to their colleagues without children.
Table 5: Current Satisfaction and Perceptions: Comparing Mothers and Non-mothers.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Satisfaction Fair Salary Fair Tasks Commuting
Mother (1/0) 0.0390∗∗∗ -0.0519∗∗∗ -0.0161 0.0698∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
Observations 6842 5951 6245 6857
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.051 0.033 0.034
Individual controls X X X X
University controls X X X X
Department FE X X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In order to explore more in depth the dynamic impact of childbirths on careers, we
now show the results of our second model (Equation 2), focusing on academics who were
not full professors at the beginning of 2012, and chose to have a baby in the meantime
(or not). This specification also allows us to disentangle between the ”extensive” and
the ”intensive” margin of motherhood. We look at the differential likelihood of becom-
ing professors by the time of our survey (2017) and earning more than a gross salary
of £62.500. We find (Table 6) that the effect of having a child on becoming a professor
is negative and statistically significant for both the intensive and the extensive margins.
Mothers are less likely than non-mothers to become professor (Column 1). Mothers who
gave birth after 2012 are less likely to be professor at the time of our survey than moth-
ers who had their last child before 2010 (Column 2). We also find a negative effect on
salary for both margins, though this effect is statistically significant only at the extensive
margins (Column 4). Our findings seem to suggest that the motherhood penalty is partic-
ularly strong in the short-run. While becoming a mother hurts a woman career (Column
1), the effect seems to dissipate over time (though not comparable per se since the two
control groups are different, it is interesting to note that the coefficients in column 2 and
4 are more than 3 times higher than those in column 1 and 3, respectively). This suggests
that interventions shortly after giving birth may be particularly appropriate to mitigate
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the motherhood penalty. We turn to this question in the next section.
Table 6: Motherhood Impact on Full Professorship and Earning £62,500 or More.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Professor Professor Salary Salary
Becoming mother (vs not) -0.0211∗∗ -0.0147
(0.010) (0.012)
Youngest Child Post-2012 (Pre-2010) -0.0946∗∗∗ -0.0452∗
(0.025) (0.026)
Observations 2646 1896 2442 1833
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.091 0.101 0.114
Individual controls X X X X
University controls X X X X
Age at 2012 X X X X
N. Children at 2012 X X X X
Department FE X X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
6 Correlates of Motherhood Penalties: Empirical results
We present in this section the effect of maternity leave provisions (i.e. de jure support)
and formal and informal practice at the workplace and within the household (i.e. de facto
support) on the various dimensions of the motherhood penalty.
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Table 7: Correlates of the Motherhood Penalties: Current Salary and Contract.
Salary Professor Permanent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FWE 247.3∗∗ 0.00179 -0.00521∗
(102.173) (0.003) (0.003)
Childcare h. 5728.1∗∗∗ 0.0537∗∗∗ 0.0266
(680.800) (0.019) (0.018)
HoD Support -505.0 -0.0378∗∗ -0.0298∗
(648.190) (0.019) (0.015)
Excluded -2453.1∗∗∗ -0.0663∗∗∗ -0.0187
(694.349) (0.023) (0.017)
Relief Availability 1535.7∗ 0.0136 0.0490∗∗
(829.335) (0.027) (0.021)
Unsupp. Partner -2191.7∗∗∗ -0.0330 -0.0217
(744.109) (0.023) (0.023)
Supp. Partner 2188.3∗ -0.000702 0.0102
(1178.465) (0.031) (0.029)
Observations 1596 1311 1701 1378 1692 1370
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.396 0.180 0.208 0.384 0.421
Current controls X X X X X X
Controls at birth X X X X X X
HEI controls X X X X X X
Department FE X X X X X X
Birthyear FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 7 shows our results for a first group of career outcomes, controlling for the full
set of individual and university level characteristics discussed in Section 4.3.40 Columns
40Full tables available upon request.
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1, 3 and 5 show the results associated to maternity leave generosity (FWE), Columns 2,
4, 6 show the results for the other forms of support: childcare, support from the HoD,
exclusion from important departmental decision, workload relief, and support from the
partner.
We discover that a marginal increase in the FWE index - corresponding to about three
extra weeks at full salary - is positively and significantly associated to an increase in cur-
rent wage by around £250 (Column 1). We also notice how women whose partners have a
very limited involvement in childcare responsibilities currently earn less, and vice-versa
(Column 2). These effects are quite large, corresponding to 12% of a standard deviation
(17% for the variable encompassing “positive” support). As already noted, the magni-
tude of these coefficients might be driven by mothers’ unobserved preferences for work-
life balance. Similarly, mothers having access to 30 or more hours of childcare per week
earn significantly more than their colleagues who did not receive as much support41, as
do those who did not feel excluded from important departmental activities that they con-
sidered vital to career enhancement. We recover the same signs and significance for these
two variables when we look at the likelihood of currently being a professor (Column 3),
whereas neither this outcome, nor the chances of having a permanent contract (Column
4), appear to be correlated with the generosity of leave provisions (Columns 3 and 5).42
In Table 8 we examine perceptions of satisfaction and fairness, measured at the time
of the survey. While de jure leave generosity does not seem to exert any impact on these
variables (Columns 1,3,5), we find that de facto departmental support and inclusiveness
significantly correlates with each of them (Columns 2,4,6). One possible explanation is
that a positive personal experience at childbirths matters more in shaping perceptions
about academia being an inclusive environment, as well as overall satisfaction, compared
to formal entitlements. Also in this case, the arrow of causality might also go in the
opposite direction, with those who are currently more satisfied being more prone to re-
evaluate their past in a more favourable light.
41Once again, we run the risk of capturing the inverse relationship, especially if income is time-
dependent, with better-off households being able to afford more hours of childcare.
42We believe that part of the effect of FWE on career outcomes might be absorbed by the controls we use,
in particular the ranking of the mother’s institution at childbirth (Russell Group and/or Golden Triangle).
Previous research (Epifanio and Troeger, 2019) has in fact shown how more research intensive HEIs tend
to offer better paid and longer occupational maternity packages as a way to attract and retain high-quality
female academics.
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Table 8: Correlates of the Motherhood Penalty: Current Satisfaction and Fairness.
Satisfied Fair Salary Fair Tasks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FWE 0.00272 -0.00161 0.000194
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Childcare Hours 0.00971 -0.00240 0.00257
(0.019) (0.032) (0.028)
HoD Support 0.119∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.032) (0.034)
Excluded -0.162∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.027) (0.031)
Relief Availability 0.0141 0.0200 0.0591∗
(0.028) (0.034) (0.033)
Unsupp. Partner -0.0271 0.0132 -0.0288
(0.025) (0.034) (0.034)
Supp. Partner -0.0288 -0.0646 -0.136∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.045) (0.048)
Observations 1654 1367 1446 1207 1528 1277
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.091 0.044 0.077 0.041 0.094
Current controls X X X X X X
Controls at birth X X X X X X
HEI controls X X X X X X
Department FE X X X X X X
Birthyear FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Finally, we look at the activities mothers performed while on leave to understand
whether the generosity of occupational maternity pay possibly exacerbates the deprecia-
tion of human capital due to absence from work widely discussed in the literature. Re-
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sults presented in Table 9 do not support the idea of more generous leave “crowding-out”
research efforts by academic mothers.43 We do find, however, a negative and significant
association between higher FWE and chances of undertaking ad-hoc teaching while on
leave. This is not surprising: if mothers do not bear a substantial salary hit staying home,
they face lower pressure to work occasionally shortly after childbirth.
Table 9: Maternity Pay Generosity and Activities After Latest Childbirth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Research Teach Admin Conferences Mentor Journal
FWE 0.00183 -0.00441∗∗ 0.00178 -0.00141 0.00136 -0.00330
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.007 0.013 0.051 0.118 0.029
Controls at birth X X X X X X
HEI controls X X X X X X
Department FE X X X X X X
Birthyear FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
7 Robustness Checks
We conducted several sanity checks to ensure our findings remain robust to the inclusion
of alternative proxies and to the use of alternative specifications.
We replicate the analysis discussed in Section 4.1 in Appendix C.1, finding similar re-
sults when using separate indicators for the number of children as well as a count variable
(C.1.1), when comparing mothers with one child to those choosing to have more (C.1.2),
and when running those regressions with binary outcomes using a logistic model (C.1.3).
In order to test for the robustness of the model presented in Section 4.2, we perform a
number of tests, whose results are presented in C.2. We show how the coefficients remain
43Results vary by disciplines, however. Mothers in fields that require where laboratory activities and
field work are crucial tend to be less active in their research endeavours while on maternity leave (results
available upon request). This suggests that generous maternity leave allows for optimal allocation of tasks
only if mothers are not subject to external constraints such as access to necessary equipment for research.
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stable to the adoption of a rank variable for salary (C.2.1), when employing a logit model
(C.2.2), when changing the treatment group by focusing on the first childbirth (C.2.3),
and, finally when we choosing different thresholds (C.2.4). We find comparable results
in sign and magnitude, with coefficients losing significance, especially for salaries, once
we set our threshold closer to the survey date, which is not surprising given that this sig-
nificantly reduces the likelihood of the respondent becoming professor or moving onto a
higher salary band in the meantime.
We also perform a number of rubustness checks for our analysis of the correlates of
motherhood penalty 4.3) in Appendix C.3. First, we run all the regressions using an al-
ternative measure of maternity leave generosity - full-salary replacement weeks - finding
coefficients that are broadly consistent (C.3.1). Second, we employ a logistic regression,
whenever relevant, with results being virtually unchanged (C.3.2). Third, we consider the
mother’s oldest, rather than youngest, childbirth (C.3.3), finding consistent but, as antici-
pated, weaker coefficients, possibly due to the longer lag between the survey date and the
event under scrutiny. Fourth, we replicate our analysis computing, whenever possible,
the average of both dependent and independent variables across childbirths (C.3.4). This
latter robustness test allows us, at the cost of sacrificing some precision in our estimates,
to alleviate the risk of outliers (e.g. problematic pregnancies, long lags between child-
births...) driving the results. In this specification, we recover all the results obtained in
the main body of the paper, when looking at the most recent delivery. Finally, we employ
a different proxy for the support from the Head of Department in Appendix C.3.5, exploit-
ing a similar survey item asking the support received bu HoDs in the two years following
childbirth (rather than about the return from leave) and find a comparable effect.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we exploit an original survey giving voice to academic women to explore
the costs of motherhood and the factors that impact their professional lives. While we
do not find conclusive evidence in support of a motherhood penalty in terms of salaries,
our novel data allows us to explore subtler disparities. Even in an environment such as
the UK academia, where workers are highly educated and can often benefit from flexi-
ble working arrangement, having a child appears to reduce mothers’ chances of climbing
the academic ladder and becoming professors. This is particularly the case when we
look at the impact of having a child later, rather than sooner, on the chances of reaching
a professorial contract and the highest salary band by the time of the survey. Though
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mothers seem to be more satisfied with their current jobs than women with no children,
their contentment in this dimension is counterbalanced by a stronger perception of being
underpaid compared to male colleagues in similar hierarchical positions. We argue that
this ambivalent effect, taken together with the finding of academic women tending to
postpone pregnancy until tenured, are consistent with the so-called “leaking pipe” phe-
nomenon. Mothers are also likely to have reached a secure position, due to their higher
experience, and are generally happier with their status, but they become increasingly dis-
satisfied with the under-representation of women in top positions of the academic ladder.
We then show how formal, informal and domestic forms of support all play a signifi-
cant, though different, role in explaining the disadvantages mothers bear in the working
environment. Mothers having access to more generous maternity provisions exhibit sig-
nificantly higher current salaries. Most importantly, a well paid leave does not appear to
crowd out research activity, but actually alleviates mothers’ financial pressure to return
to work early and carry out ad-hoc teaching at a delicate time of their lives. The impor-
tance of remaining active research-wise, and the crucial role played by other forms of
support in the weeks following childbirth, are supported by the fact that primary child-
carers exhibit lower current salaries compared to mothers whose partners evenly share
child-rearing duties in the first years of the baby’s life. Similarly, mothers with access to
longer childcare hours earn currently more than those who did not benefit from this form
of assistance.
Finally, the perception of a supportive and inclusive working environment at child-
birth is positively correlated with higher levels of job satisfaction and perceived fairness
reported for the current job. Taken together, these results highlight the need to expand our
horizons when it comes to analysing the effects of motherhood on female careers. Hav-
ing children does not simply affect career outcomes, but dramatically reshapes women’s
psychological attitudes in the workplace and beyond, in a way that could hardly be tack-
led by a one-size-fits-all policy interventions. While maternity provisions and childcare
support significantly benefit mothers’ careers, a smooth and sympathetic approach to
the motherhood experience by the employer positively and persistently correlates with
feelings of satisfaction and fairness in academia, even many years following delivery.
Moreover, we find that subjective feelings of “exclusion” from the departmental decision-
making actually reflect into a substantially lower likelihood for these mothers to climb
the academic ladder, making a favourable and inclusive work environment even more
important.
Our results, we repeatedly cautioned, may not uncover causal relationships (e.g., our
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estimates may suffer from reverse causality). Yet, our paper is unique in documented the
multifaced motherhood penalties and surveying an entire sector. In this last paragraph,
we take a leap of faith and discuss the potential policy implications of our work. Our
analysis unveils the sometimes subtle effects of different policy interventions on different
occupational and personal dimensions, highlighting that there is, unfortunately, no cure-
all remedy for the motherhood penalties. A more inclusive firm culture is best suited to
improve mothers’ satisfaction at work, broadly conceived. This could be achieved by de-
signing and arranging adequate training opportunities for line managers, so to help them
understanding and coping with mothers’ necessities. Adequate childcare provision and
generous maternity leave policies appear to be key to foster mothers’ career. While costly,
these measures would help mothers retaining their professional networks and would en-
sure they do not step back from their research agenda (in other words, these forms of
support limit the depreciation of mothers’ human capital while on leave).
Our recommendations above would alleviate the motherhood penalties, but not elim-
inate them. This paper also highlights the consequences of gender disparity within the
household. An equal sharing of the childcare duties with the partner is a key predictor of
mothers’ current earning power, even in the academic sector. A dramatic transformation
of cultural and social stereotypes on who “should be” the primary caretaker appears to be
much needed. We believe that the launch of Shared Parental Leave in 2015 represents an
interesting novelty for the UK.44 The timing of our survey makes it impossible to study
the impact of such reform. Nonetheless, we hope that our results motivate scholars to
study the consequences of encouraging fathers to take on a more active role during the
first years of their children’s lives.
44The low uptake of such leave (less than 2% in 2018, according to the Department of Business, Energy
and Industrial Strategy) is slightly depressing in light of our findings. See https://www.bbc.com/news/
business-43026312.
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Lutter, M. and M. Schröder (2020). Is there a motherhood penalty in academia? the
gendered effect of children on academic publications in german sociology. European
Sociological Review 36(3), 442–459.
Lyness, K. S., C. A. Thompson, A. M. Francesco, and M. K. Judiesch (1999). Work and
pregnancy: Individual and organizational factors influencing organizational commit-
ment, timing of maternity leave, and return to work. Sex roles 41(7-8), 485–508.
Mason, M. A., N. H. Wolfinger, and M. Goulden (2013). Do babies matter.
McIntosh, B., R. McQuaid, A. Munro, and P. Dabir-Alai (2012). Motherhood and its impact
on career progression. Gender in Management: An International Journal.
Ondrich, J., C. K. Spiess, Q. Yang, and G. G. Wagner (2003). The liberalization of maternity
leave policy and the return to work after childbirth in germany. Review of Economics of
the Household 1(1-2), 77–110.
Ondrich, J. I., C. K. Spieß, and Q. Yang (2002). The effect of maternity leave on women’s
pay in germany 1984-1994. Technical report, DIW Discussion Papers.
Puhani, P. A. and K. Sonderhof (2011). The effects of parental leave extension on training
for young women. Journal of Population Economics 24(2), 731–760.
Rønsen, M. and M. Sundström (2002). Family policy and after-birth employment among
new mothers–a comparison of finland, norway and sweden. European Journal of Popu-
lation/Revue europeenne de demographie 18(2), 121–152.
33
Schönberg, U. and J. Ludsteck (2014). Expansions in maternity leave coverage and moth-
ers’ labor market outcomes after childbirth. Journal of Labor Economics 32(3), 469–505.
Sigle-Rushton, W. and J. Waldfogel (2007). Motherhood and women’s earnings in anglo-
american, continental european, and nordic countries. Feminist economics 13(2), 55–91.
Stratton, L. S. (1995). The effect interruptions in work experience have on wages. Southern
Economic Journal, 955–970.
Thompson, C. A., L. L. Beauvais, and K. S. Lyness (1999). When work–family benefits are
not enough: The influence of work–family culture on benefit utilization, organizational
attachment, and work–family conflict. Journal of Vocational behavior 54(3), 392–415.
Travis, E. L., L. Doty, and D. L. Helitzer (2013). Sponsorship: a path to the academic
medicine c-suite for women faculty? Academic Medicine 88(10), 1414–1417.
Troeger, V. E., R. Di Leo, M. Epifanio, and T. J. Scotto (2020). Motherhood in academia: A
novel dataset with an application to maternity leave uptake. Unpublished Manuscript.
Van den Brink, M. and Y. Benschop (2012). Slaying the seven-headed dragon: The quest
for gender change in academia. Gender, Work & Organization 19(1), 71–92.
Waldfogel, J. (1997). The effect of children on women’s wages. American sociological review,
209–217.
Waldfogel, J. (1998). The family gap for young women in the united states and britain:
Can maternity leave make a difference? Journal of labor economics 16(3), 505–545.
Waldfogel, J. (2001). Family-friendly policies for families with young children. Employee
Rights and Employment Policy Journal 5, 273.
Ward, K. and L. Wolf-Wendel (2004). Academic motherhood: Managing complex roles in
research universities. The Review of Higher Education 27(2), 233–257.
Wentling, R. and S. Thomas (2009). Workplace culture that hinders and assists the career
development of women in information technology. Information Technology, Learning &
Performance Journal 25(1).
Yu, W.-h. and J. C.-L. Kuo (2017). The motherhood wage penalty by work conditions:
How do occupational characteristics hinder or empower mothers? American Sociological
Review 82(4), 744–769.
34
Zveglich, Jr, J. E. and Y. v. d. M. Rodgers (2003). The impact of protective measures for
female workers. Journal of Labor Economics 21(3), 533–555.
35
Appendix
A Descriptive Statistics
Below descriptive statistics for the main outcomes and controls employed in our empiri-
cal analysis.
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics: Dependent Variables (at Time of the Survey).
Mothers Non-Mothers
Mean St. Dev. N. Mean St. Dev. N. p-value
Gross Salary 48824 16255 3358 44827 14344 3128 0.000
Gross Salary≥62.5k 0.21 0.40 3358 0.13 0.33 3128 0.000
Professor 0.23 0.42 3722 0.15 0.35 3603 0.000
Permanent 0.80 0.40 3688 0.63 0.48 3577 0.000
Satisfaction 0.78 0.41 3684 0.77 0.42 3421 0.000
Salary Fair 0.47 0.50 3238 0.57 0.50 2942 0.000
Responsibilities Fair 0.60 0.49 3322 0.65 0.48 3169 0.000
Commute≥45mins 0.40 0.49 3677 0.33 0.47 3402 0.000
Leave Research 0.35 0.48 3722 0 0 0 -
Leave Teach 0.07 0.25 3722 0 0 0 -
Leave Admin Tasks 0.09 0.29 3722 0 0 0 -
Leave Conferences 0.20 0.40 3722 0 0 0 -
Leave Mentoring 0.27 0.44 3722 0 0 0 -
Leave Journal 0.23 0.42 3722 0 0 0 -
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics: Independent Variables (at Time of the Survey).
Mothers Non-Mothers
Mean St. Dev. N. Mean St. Dev. N. p-value
Age 46.91 8.88 3033 41.60 9.78 2722 0.000
N. Children 1.77 0.75 3722 0 0 3604 -
Appointment Year 2010 17.84 3639 2012 5.19 3555 0.000
N. Occupations 1.40 0.98 3722 1.42 0.93 3604 0.321
Russell Group 0.47 0.50 3711 0.52 0.50 3595 0.000
Golden Triangle 0.18 0.38 3711 0.21 0.40 3595 0.004
RAE Score 2008 123 23 3698 123 23 3581 0.182
Sh. Fem. Academics 0.44 0.06 3698 0.43 0.06 3581 0.002
Avg. Fem. Salary 41100 2482 3698 41082 2401 3581 0.758
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics: Independent Variables (at Youngest Chilbirth).
Mothers
Mean St. Dev. N.
Childbirth Year 2005 9.60 3286
Mother’s Age at Childbirth 35.40 4.54 2976
Permanent 0.61 0.49 2950
Partner Rank: High Academic 0.16 0.36 3286
Partner Rank: Low Academic 0.18 0.38 3286
Partner Rank: High Non-Academic 0.31 0.46 3286
Partner Rank: No Info 0.09 0.29 3286
Partner Help: ≤25% 0.32 0.47 3286
Partner Help: >75% 0.10 0.30 3286
Partner Help: No Info 0.20 0.40 3286
Childcare Hours ≥30 0.55 0.50 2771
FWE 17.55 3.78 1866
Supportive HoD 0.55 0.50 2592
Excluded 0.40 0.49 2600
Relief 0.18 0.39 3286
Age (2012) 41.65 8.89 3033
N. Children (2012) 1.31 0.94 3286
Russell Group 0.52 0.50 1871
Golden Triangle 0.21 0.41 1871
RAE Score 2008 124 22 1866
Sh. Fem. Academics 0.43 0.06 1866
Avg. Fem. Salary 41091 2369 1866
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B Survey Items
In this section, we present the wording of the survey items used to construct our main
dependent and independent variables. The full questionnaire can be retrieved in Troeger
et al. (2020).
B.1 Dependent Variables
1. Salary: What is your current gross annual salary?
Possible answers:
• from “under £20,000”
• to “above £100,001” (by increments of £5,000)
We took the midpoint for each category (e.g. £27,500 if between “£25,001 and £30,000“).
We attribute a value of £17,000 to those below £20,000 (34 observations). We exclude
respondents with salary above £100,001 (16 observations), since we cannot easily at-
tribute a value to their earnings.
2. Professor: What is your current title or role?
Possible answers:
• Professor
• Associate Professor
• Reader
• Senior Lecturer
• Lecturer
• Early Career Researcher
• Research Assistant
• Other
We generated a dummy with value 1 if the respondent reported to be a professor, 0
for all other ranks.
3. Permanent: Which best describes your current employment contract?
Possible answers:
• Permanent
• Probationary (with a defined route to permanency)
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• Fixed-Term
We constructed a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent reported to
be on permanent contract, 0 in the remaining cases.
4. Satisfaction: Please evaluate the level of satisfaction you have with your current job
Possible answers:
• Very Satisfied
• Satisfied
• Somewhat Satisfied
• Neutral
• Somewhat Dissatisfied
• Dissatisfied
• Very Dissatisfied
We dichotomized responses into a dummy with value 1 if the respondent reported
to be very satisfied, satisfied, somewhat satisfied (0 otherwise).
5. Salary Fairness: Do you believe that, in comparison to your male colleagues, your salary
is fair?
Possible answers:
• Definitely Yes
• Probably Yes
• Probably Not
• Definitely Not
• Don’t Know
We built a dummy equal to 1 if the answer was definitely or probably yes (0 other-
wise). ”Don’t Know”s are dropped from the analysis.
6. Responsibility Fairness: Do you think the teaching and administrative responsibilities
you are asked to undertake are fair in comparison to the tasks assigned to your male col-
leagues of equal rank?
Possible answers:
• Definitely Yes
• Probably Yes
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• Probably Not
• Definitely Not
• Don’t Know
We built a dummy equal to 1 if the answer was definitely or probably yes (0 other-
wise). ”Don’t Know”s are dropped from the analysis.
7. Commuting: Approximately how long does it take you to commute from your home to the
University?
Possible answers:
• Less than 15 minutes
• Between 15 and 30 minutes
• Between 31 and 45 minutes
• Between 46 and 60 minutes
• Between 1 and 2 hours
• More than 2 hours
We generated a dummy equal to 1 if commuting time is above 45 minutes, 0 other-
wise.
8. Activities: (If the respondent indicated they took any form of maternity leave after the
birth of their first/second/third youngest child): During your maternity leave for your
first/second/third youngest child, which, if any, of the following academic activities did you
undertake? (Tick All that Apply)
Possible answers:
• Keeping in touch with academic colleagues for work related purposes
• Mentoring and working with post-doctoral and/or doctoral students
• Attending academic conferences
• Conducting research
• Teaching classes on an ad hoc basis
• Undertaking administrative duties at the University
• Undertaking administrative duties associated with your field or discipline (e.g.
edited a journal, submitting a peer review)
• Other
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• Not Applicable–I was not in Academia
• Don’t Know/Don’t Remember
We coded each answer as a separate dummy, equal to one if the respondent under-
took that activity, else 0.
B.2 Independent Variables
1. Childcare Duration: In a typical week, during term time, how many hours of childcare was
(is or will be) available to you for your youngest child for the two years after you returned
to work from maternity leave?
Possible answers:
• Less than 5
• Between 6 and 10
• Between 11 and 20
• Between 21 and 30
• Between 31 and 40
• More than 40
• Don’t Know or Don’t Remember
We constructed a dummy taking value 1 if the respondent reported more than 30
hours of childcare were available upon return from leave (0 otherwise).
2. HoD support: Referring to the period around the birth of your first child, how supportive
was your Head of Department?
Possible answers:
• Very supportive
• Slightly Supportive
• Neither Supportive nor unsupportive
• Slightly unsupprtive
• Very unsupportive
We constructed a dummy taking value 1 if the respondent reported the HoD was
very or slightly supportive (0 otherwise). As a robustness test, we employed a sur-
vey item asking about perceived HoD support in the first 2 years following each
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childbirth. The options provided are the same and a comparable dummy is gener-
ated accordingly.
3. Excluded: After returning to work from childbirth and/or maternity leave following the
birth of your second youngest child, did you feel excluded from important Departmental or
Work Related activities that could be considered vital to career enhancement?
Possible answers:
• Yes, definitely
• Yes, somewhat
• Only occasionally
• Not at all
• No applicable or Don’t Know
We built a dummy equal to 1 if the answer was only occasionally, yes somewhat/definitely,
0 otherwise). ”Don’t Know”s are dropped from the analysis.
4. Relief: When you returned to work following the birth of your first child, were you offered
any of the following:
Possible answers:
• Teaching relief
• Admin relief
• Teaching relief
• Research outputs relief
• Sabbatical
• Other
We generated a dummy equal to 1 if at least one of these forms of relief was offered
(0 otheriwse).
5. Partner Support: Approximately what percentage of childcare responsibilities were (are or
will be) handled by your partner or spouse in the two years following your youngest child’s
birth?
Possible answers:
• Less than 10%
• Between 11 and 25%
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• Between 26% and 50%
• Between 51% and 75%
• Between 76% and 100%
• Don’t Know or Don’t remember
We generate four sets of dummies taking value one if reported support was, respec-
tively: (1) below 25%; (2) between 26 and 75%; (3) above 75%; (4) Don’t Know or
Don’t remember.
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C Robustness Tests
C.1 Estimating the Motherhood Penalties: Robustness
C.1.1 Dichotomous and Rank Variables for Children
In Table C.1 and C.2, we replace the indicator variable for motherhood with a series of
dichotomous controls taking value 1 if the mother had, respectively, one, two, three, four
or more children (0 if none). Findings are consistent with those presented in the main
body of the paper. The same holds true when we substitute the indicator with a count
variable for the number of children, ranging from 0 to 6 (C.3 and C.4).
Table C.1: Current Salary and Contract: Comparing Mothers and Non-mothers.
(1) (2) (3)
Salary Professor Permanent
One Child -648.2 0.0126 0.0455∗∗∗
(468.133) (0.011) (0.011)
Two Children -557.3 0.00910 0.0687∗∗∗
(467.208) (0.011) (0.012)
Three Children -750.2 0.0119 0.0500∗∗∗
(809.068) (0.028) (0.019)
Four+ Children -553.1 -0.0571 -0.0116
(1549.007) (0.043) (0.040)
Observations 6281 6907 6858
Adjusted R2 0.534 0.236 0.424
Individual controls X X X
University controls X X X
Department FE X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.2: Current Satisfaction and Perceptions: Comparing Mothers and Non-mothers.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Satisfaction Fair Salary Fair Tasks Commuting
One Child 0.0300∗∗ -0.0468∗∗∗ -0.0145 0.0765∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019)
Two Children 0.0497∗∗∗ -0.0500∗∗∗ -0.0213 0.0605∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Three Children 0.0275 -0.0857∗∗∗ 0.0178 0.0858∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.029) (0.024) (0.028)
Four+ Children 0.0320 -0.0424 -0.0911 0.0710
(0.046) (0.054) (0.061) (0.055)
Observations 6842 5951 6245 6857
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.050 0.034 0.033
Individual controls X X X X
University controls X X X X
Department FE X X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.3: Current Salary and Contract: Comparing Mothers and Non-mothers.
(1) (2) (3)
Salary Professor Permanent
N. Children -247.0 0.00147 0.0223∗∗∗
(203.548) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 6281 6907 6858
Adjusted R2 0.534 0.235 0.423
Individual controls X X X
University controls X X X
Department FE X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.4: Current Satisfaction and Perceptions: Comparing Mothers and Non-mothers.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Satisfaction Fair Salary Fair Tasks Commuting
N. Children 0.0169∗∗∗ -0.0231∗∗∗ -0.00731 0.0285∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 6842 5951 6245 6857
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.050 0.033 0.032
Individual controls X X X X
University controls X X X X
Department FE X X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.1.2 Comparing Mothers with One or More Children
In Table C.5 and C.6 we focus on the “intensive” margin, restricting our analysis on the
subset of mothers and on the effect of having a further baby. We therefore adopt an
indicator equal to one if the mother had more than one child (0 if just one), finding results
in line with those obtained when comparing mothers and non-mothers.
Table C.5: Current Salary and Contract: Comparing Mothers with One or More Children.
(1) (2) (3)
Salary Professor Permanent
More than 1 child 158.4 -0.00577 0.0285∗∗
(464.214) (0.014) (0.012)
Observations 3241 3572 3544
Adjusted R2 0.510 0.203 0.335
Individual controls X X X
University controls X X X
Department FE X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.6: Current Satisfaction and Perceptions: Comparing Mothers with One or More
Children.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Satisfaction Fair Salary Fair Tasks Commuting
More than 1 child 0.0146 -0.0196 0.00132 -0.00371
(0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
Observations 3533 3110 3189 3544
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.022 0.030 0.036
Individual controls X X X X
University controls X X X X
Department FE X X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.1.3 Estimation with Logit Model
Replicating the analysis employing a logit regression for the binary outcomes yields con-
sistent results, as shown in Tables C.7 and C.8
Table C.7: Current Salary and Contract: Comparing Mothers and Non-mothers.
(1) (2)
Professor Permanent
Mother (1/0) 0.0914 0.398∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.077)
Observations 6907 6858
Individual controls X X
University controls X X
Department FE X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.8: Current Satisfaction and Perceptions: Comparing Mothers and Non-mothers.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Satisfaction Fair Salary Fair Tasks Commuting
Mother (1/0) 0.231∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.0724 0.318∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.061) (0.062) (0.070)
Observations 6842 5951 6245 6857
Individual controls X X X X
University controls X X X X
Department FE X X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.2 The Impact of Childbirth Timing on Careers: Robustness
In this section, we test for the roubstness of the analysis presented in Section 4.2.
C.2.1 Alternative Salary Measure
We employ at a different salary outcome, substituting the indicator used in the main body
with the rank variable it was originally derived from, and finding identical results (Table
C.9), with a £3811.10 penalty for mothers who had their most recent childbirth in the five
years preceding the survey (compared to those who did so up to the seventh year before
it).
Table C.9: Motherhood Impact on Current Salary (Rank).
(1) (2)
Salary Salary
Becoming mother (vs not) -684.7
(583.323)
Youngest Child Post-2012 (Pre-2010) -1941.0∗∗
(940.251)
Observations 2442 1833
Adjusted R2 0.239 0.223
Individual controls X X
University controls X X
Age at 2012 X X
N. Children at 2012 X X
Department FE X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
49
C.2.2 Estimation with Logit Model
Our findings are consistent when using a logit regression C.10.
Table C.10: Motherhood Impact on Full Professorship and Earning £62,500 or More.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Professor Professor Salary Salary
Becoming mother (vs not) -0.551∗∗ -0.347
(0.267) (0.246)
Youngest Child Post-2012 (Pre-2010) -1.087∗∗∗ -0.489∗
(0.266) (0.263)
Observations 2527 1849 2423 1794
Individual controls X X X X
University controls X X X X
Age at 2012 X X X X
N. Children at 2012 X X X X
Department FE X X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.2.3 Different Definition of Treated Mothers
We find comparable results when we re-define our treated individuals as those having
their oldest child (rather than their latest, as we do in the main text), as we do in Table
C.11.
Table C.11: Motherhood Impact on Full Professorship and Earning £62,500 or More.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Professor Professor Salary Salary
Becoming mother (vs not) -0.0211∗∗ -0.0147
(0.010) (0.012)
First Child Post-2012 (Last Pre-2010) -0.118∗∗∗ -0.0646∗
(0.037) (0.038)
Observations 2646 1621 2442 1570
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.099 0.101 0.123
Individual controls X X X X
University controls X X X X
Age at 2012 X X X X
N. Children at 2012 X X X X
Department FE X X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.2.4 Different Choice of the Threshold
Finally, we check for the robustness of our results to the choice of different thresholds:
the 1st of January 2011, 2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively (Tables C.12, C.13, C.14, C.15).
Coefficients are consistent in sign and generally significant, even though they reasonably
tend to lose magnitude and significance as we set our threshold closer to the time of the
survey.
Table C.12: Motherhood Impact on Full Professorship and Earning £62,500 or More.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Professor Professor Salary Salary
Becoming mother (vs not) -0.0263∗∗ -0.0302∗∗
(0.011) (0.012)
Becoming mother (vs before) -0.0859∗∗∗ -0.0555∗∗
(0.024) (0.026)
Observations 2466 2028 2272 1956
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.102 0.098 0.115
Individual controls X X X X
University controls X X X X
Age at 2011 X X X X
N. Children at 2011 X X X X
Department FE X X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.13: Motherhood Impact on Full Professorship and Earning £62,500 or More.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Professor Professor Salary Salary
Becoming mother (vs not) -0.0131 -0.00891
(0.010) (0.014)
Becoming mother (vs before) -0.0510∗∗ -0.0203
(0.020) (0.023)
Observations 2791 2147 2569 2077
Adjusted R2 0.086 0.081 0.098 0.092
Individual controls X X X X
University controls X X X X
Age at 2013 X X X X
N. Children at 2013 X X X X
Department FE X X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.14: Motherhood Impact on Full Professorship and Earning £62,500 or More.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Professor Professor Salary Salary
Becoming mother (vs not) -0.0210∗∗ -0.00620
(0.009) (0.016)
Becoming mother (vs before) -0.0494∗∗∗ -0.0301
(0.017) (0.020)
Observations 2990 2235 2752 2163
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.072 0.103 0.090
Individual controls X X X X
University controls X X X X
Age at 2014 X X X X
N. Children at 2014 X X X X
Department FE X X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.15: Motherhood Impact on Full Professorship and Earning £62,500 or More.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Professor Professor Salary Salary
Becoming mother (vs not) -0.00569 0.00283
(0.009) (0.016)
Becoming mother (vs before) -0.0253∗ -0.0120
(0.013) (0.016)
Observations 3140 2295 2892 2225
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.072 0.094 0.085
Individual controls X X X X
University controls X X X X
Age at 2015 X X X X
N. Children at 2015 X X X X
Department FE X X X X
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.3 Correlates of the Motherhood Penalties: Robustness
In this final section, we check the robustness the analysis presented in Section 4.3.
C.3.1 Full Salary Replacement Weeks
We begin by adopting an alternative index to the Full Weeks Equivalent (FWE), employ-
ing the number of weeks at full salary offered by the university occupational policy at
the time of the most recent childbirth. Results shown in Tables C.16, C.17 and C.18 are
broadly consistent with those in the main body. We recover in particular the positive
relationship between a more generous leave and current salary.
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Table C.16: Correlates of the Motherhood Penalty: Current Salary and Contract.
Salary Professor Permanent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Salary 139.7∗∗∗ 0.0000261 -0.00141
(47.114) (0.001) (0.002)
Childcare h. 5728.1∗∗∗ 0.0537∗∗∗ 0.0266
(680.800) (0.019) (0.018)
HoD Support -505.0 -0.0378∗∗ -0.0298∗
(648.190) (0.019) (0.015)
Excluded -2453.1∗∗∗ -0.0663∗∗∗ -0.0187
(694.349) (0.023) (0.017)
Relief Availability 1535.7∗ 0.0136 0.0490∗∗
(829.335) (0.027) (0.021)
Unsupp. Partner -2191.7∗∗∗ -0.0330 -0.0217
(744.109) (0.023) (0.023)
Supp. Partner 2188.3∗ -0.000702 0.0102
(1178.465) (0.031) (0.029)
Observations 1596 1311 1701 1378 1692 1370
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.396 0.180 0.208 0.383 0.421
Current controls X X X X X X
Controls at birth X X X X X X
Department FE X X X X X X
Birthyear FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.17: Correlates of the Motherhood Penalty: Current Satisfaction and Fairness.
Satisfied Fair Salary Fair Tasks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Salary 0.00127 -0.000788 0.00121
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Childcare h. 0.00971 -0.00240 0.00257
(0.019) (0.032) (0.028)
HoD Support 0.119∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.032) (0.034)
Excluded -0.162∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.027) (0.031)
Relief Availability 0.0141 0.0200 0.0591∗
(0.028) (0.034) (0.033)
Unsupp. Partner -0.0271 0.0132 -0.0288
(0.025) (0.034) (0.034)
Supp. Partner -0.0288 -0.0646 -0.136∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.045) (0.048)
Observations 1654 1367 1446 1207 1528 1277
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.091 0.044 0.077 0.041 0.094
Current controls X X X X X X
Controls at birth X X X X X X
HEI controls X X X X X X
Department FE X X X X X X
Birthyear FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.18: Correlates of the Motherhood Penalty: Activities After Oldest Childbirth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Research Teaching Admin. Conferences Mentor Journal
Full Salary 0.00191 -0.00169 0.000264 0.0000405 0.000825 -0.00117
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.006 0.013 0.051 0.118 0.028
Controls at birth X X X X X X
HEI controls X X X X X X
Department FE X X X X X X
Birthyear FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.3.2 Logit Specification
We then replicate our analysis for the binary outcomes using a logit specification in Table
C.19, C.20, C.21, and coefficients again appear quite stable in sign and significance.
Table C.19: Correlates of the Motherhood Penalty: Current Salary and Contract.
Professor Permanent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FWE 0.0187 -0.0779∗∗
(0.031) (0.034)
Childcare h. 0.552∗∗ 0.259
(0.232) (0.245)
HoD Support -0.394∗∗ -0.559∗∗
(0.197) (0.221)
Excluded -0.715∗∗∗ -0.459∗∗
(0.248) (0.188)
Relief Availability 0.220 0.548∗∗
(0.288) (0.261)
Unsupp. Partner -0.406∗ -0.309
(0.236) (0.269)
Supp. Partner -0.0140 -0.188
(0.343) (0.400)
Observations 1651 1261 1564 1201
Current controls X X X X
Controls at birth X X X X
HEI controls X X X X
Department FE X X X X
Birthyear FE X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.20: Correlates of the Motherhood Penalty: Current Satisfaction and Fairness.
Satisfied Fair Salary Fair Tasks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FWE 0.0167 -0.00676 0.00115
(0.018) (0.023) (0.015)
Childcare h. 0.0564 -0.00543 0.0155
(0.137) (0.145) (0.135)
HoD Support 0.849∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.145) (0.156)
Excluded -1.141∗∗∗ -0.622∗∗∗ -0.675∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.124) (0.140)
Relief Availability 0.160 0.0813 0.287∗
(0.206) (0.151) (0.159)
Unsupp. Partner -0.178 0.0624 -0.133
(0.179) (0.152) (0.165)
Supp. Partner -0.179 -0.292 -0.662∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.207) (0.222)
Observations 1632 1332 1438 1198 1518 1268
Current controls X X X X X X
Controls at birth X X X X X X
HEI controls X X X X X X
Department FE X X X X X X
Birthyear FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.21: Correlates of the Motherhood Penalty: Activities After Oldest Childbirth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Research Teaching Admin. Conferences Mentor Journal
FWE 0.00821 -0.0639∗∗ 0.0189 -0.00628 0.00924 -0.0148
(0.012) (0.026) (0.020) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 1667 1567 1569 1628 1664 1659
Controls at birth X X X X X X
HEI controls X X X X X X
Department FE X X X X X X
Birthyear FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.3.3 Looking at the First Pregnancy
We then move into looking at the first childbirth, rather than at the latest one. The set
of covariates we control for is the same, with child-related variables being adjusted ac-
cordingly. The coefficients match those obtained in the main body of the paper (Table
C.22, C.23 and C.24) but, as anticipated, the magnitude of the effects on current outcomes
decreases, possibly due to the longer lag between the survey date and the event.
Table C.22: Correlates of the Motherhood Penalty: Current Salary and Contract.
Salary Professor Permanent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FWE 193.8∗ 0.00275 -0.00682∗∗
(102.811) (0.003) (0.003)
Childcare h. 4392.1∗∗∗ 0.0301 0.0591∗∗∗
(652.238) (0.020) (0.020)
HoD Support -1234.2∗ -0.0199 -0.00436
(685.896) (0.021) (0.021)
Excluded -2107.3∗∗∗ -0.0460∗∗ -0.00282
(693.202) (0.021) (0.018)
Relief 994.0 0.0157 0.0481∗
(972.882) (0.027) (0.025)
Unsupp. Partner -2130.4∗∗∗ -0.0185 -0.0205
(743.101) (0.026) (0.019)
Supp. Partner 1995.9∗ -0.00442 0.000276
(1116.558) (0.033) (0.028)
Observations 1374 1141 1555 1275 1545 1267
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.383 0.185 0.200 0.391 0.406
Individual controls X X X X X X
University controls X X X X X X
Department FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.23: Correlates of the Motherhood Penalty: Current Satisfaction and Fairness.
Satisfied Fair Salary Fair Tasks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FWE 0.00317 -0.00165 0.00187
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Childcare h. -0.0102 0.0419 0.0241
(0.023) (0.039) (0.034)
HoD Support 0.0712∗∗ 0.0789∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.035) (0.032)
Excluded -0.163∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.032) (0.030)
Relief 0.0239 0.0122 0.0753∗∗
(0.028) (0.039) (0.034)
Unsupp. Partner -0.0377 0.0199 -0.0226
(0.029) (0.038) (0.039)
Supp. Partner -0.0350 -0.0765 -0.0869∗
(0.046) (0.055) (0.049)
Observations 1420 1183 1239 1038 1306 1096
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.063 0.030 0.061 0.046 0.101
Current controls X X X X X X
Controls at birth X X X X X X
HEI controls X X X X X X
Department FE X X X X X X
Birthyear FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.24: Correlates of the Motherhood Penalty: Activities After Youngest Childbirth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Research Teaching Admin. Conferences Mentor Journal
FWE 0.00362 -0.00357∗ 0.00263 0.00232 0.00111 -0.00374
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 1447 1447 1447 1447 1447 1447
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.004 0.008 0.033 0.074 0.024
Controls at birth X X X X X X
HEI controls X X X X X X
Department FE X X X X X X
Birthyear FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.3.4 Averaging Support Across Pregnancies
We replicate our analysis computing, whenever possible, the average of both dependent
and independent variables across childbirths. Whenever it is not feasible or advisable to
do so (e.g. Activities while on leave), we include controls and fixed effect measured at
the time of the oldest childbirth (full tables available upon request). Results are broadly
consistent with those presented in the main text, as shown in Table C.25 and C.26.
Table C.25: Correlates of the Motherhood Penalty: Current Salary and Contract.
Salary Professor Permanent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FWE (Avg) 205.4∗∗ 0.00224 -0.00689∗∗
(102.917) (0.003) (0.003)
Childcare h. (Avg) 5162.1∗∗∗ 0.0291 0.0482∗∗
(670.712) (0.021) (0.020)
HoD Support (Avg) -1192.7∗ -0.0276 -0.0193
(689.962) (0.024) (0.022)
Excluded (Avg) -2096.7∗∗∗ -0.0450∗ -0.0110
(693.509) (0.023) (0.019)
Relief (Avg) 1300.3 0.0200 0.0591∗∗
(1029.448) (0.031) (0.026)
Unsupp. Partner (Avg) -4538.0∗∗∗ -0.0618 -0.0622∗
(1369.689) (0.046) (0.033)
Supp. Partner (Avg) 4578.7∗∗ 0.0112 0.00927
(1947.207) (0.072) (0.056)
Observations 1374 1171 1555 1310 1545 1301
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.390 0.185 0.205 0.391 0.404
Current controls X X X X X X
Controls at birth X X X X X X
HEI controls X X X X X X
Department FE X X X X X X
Birthyear FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.26: Correlates of the Motherhood Penalty: Current Satisfaction and Fairness.
Satisfied Fair Salary Fair Tasks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FWE (Avg) 0.00434 -0.00186 0.00100
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Childcare h. (Avg) 0.00205 0.0343 0.0151
(0.022) (0.040) (0.034)
HoD Support (Avg) 0.0945∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Excluded (Avg) -0.183∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.033) (0.031)
Relief (Avg) 0.0240 0.00509 0.0737∗∗
(0.032) (0.039) (0.036)
Unsupp. Partner (Avg) -0.0584 0.0353 -0.0520
(0.050) (0.065) (0.059)
Supp. Partner (Avg) -0.138 -0.0977 -0.191∗∗
(0.095) (0.098) (0.095)
Observations 1420 1215 1239 1069 1306 1126
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.075 0.030 0.063 0.046 0.109
Current controls X X X X X X
Controls at birth X X X X X X
HEI controls X X X X X X
Department FE X X X X X X
Birthyear FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.3.5 Head of Department Support in First Two Years
Finally, we recover the same positive effect on current satisfaction and perceived fairness
if we look at support from Hod in the first two years of life of the youngest baby, rather
than right upon returning from leave, by using a different survey item (Table C.27).
Table C.27: Correlates of the Motherhood Penalty: Current Satisfaction and Fairness.
Satisfied Fair Salary Fair Tasks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FWE 0.00272 -0.00161 0.000194
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Childcare Hours 0.0118 0.000551 -0.00944
(0.020) (0.032) (0.026)
HoD Support (2 years) 0.124∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.032) (0.038)
Excluded -0.147∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.030) (0.034)
Relief Availability 0.0143 0.0193 0.0480
(0.031) (0.034) (0.033)
Unsupp. Partner -0.0188 0.00436 -0.0272
(0.026) (0.037) (0.035)
Supp. Partner -0.0328 -0.0704 -0.131∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.047) (0.047)
Observations 1654 1296 1446 1145 1528 1216
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.090 0.044 0.081 0.041 0.112
Current controls X X X X X X
Controls at birth X X X X X X
HEI controls X X X X X X
Department FE X X X X X X
Birthyear FE X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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